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Introduction
In almost all OECD countries, the share of the self-employed in all employed is much lower among women than among men. The OECD averages were 18.3 % among men and only 13.4 % among women in 2007, according to the OECD Annual Labour Force Statistics. In Germany, where the overall self-employment rate is lower, the respective shares were 14.4 % versus 9.2 % ( Figure 1 ).
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The large gender difference in self-employment rates is puzzling, considering that there are reasons why self-employment may even be more attractive for women. If the well-known wage differential between men and women in dependent employment is partly explained by employer discrimination in hiring and promoting decisions, women could escape these forms of discrimination by choosing self-employment. Moreover, the greater flexibility with regard to the timing and location of work in self-employment may make self-employment comparably better combinable with child care (Budig, 2006) .
The lower self-employment rate among women may be explained by discrimination from creditors and consumers against self-employed women, which may have more severe consequences than employer discrimination. 3 Higher risk aversion of women may be another explanation, as earnings of the self-employed are much more volatile than those of employees with comparable characteristics (Heaton and Lucas, 2000; Borjas and Bronars, 1989) . From the literature we have considerable evidence that women are more risk averse than men (e.g. Dohmen et al., forthcoming; Borghans et al., 2009; Caliendo, Fossen, and Kritikos, 2009 ).
2 Only in Mexico and Turkey are the female self-employment shares higher than the male shares, which may be explained by a large number of small agricultural establishments. See Blanchflower (2000) for more information on self-employment in OECD countries, including the lower female self-employment rate. 3 Credit constraints for entrepreneurs have been discussed intensively in the literature (e.g. Hurst and Lusardi, 2004; Disney and Gathergood, 2009) . It is thus plausible to think that they may be more severe for women entrepreneurs. Borjas and Bronars (1989) discuss consumer discrimination in the context of self-employed African-Americans.
A method often applied to study gender differences is the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition approach with its variations. Georgellis and Wall (2005) 
used the Blinder-Oaxaca technique
for logit models to analyze the lower female transition rate from salaried employment into self-employment. Fairlie (1999) applied the same method to decompose the gap between
African-Americans and whites in self-employment in the U.S.A.. In these studies, the potential role of differences in risk preferences is not taken into account, however, and cannot be separated from potential lending or consumer discrimination, as explicitly acknowledged by Fairlie (1999, page 97) . 4 This paper contributes to the explanation of the gender difference in self-employment by explicitly considering the role of risk aversion. The approach is to estimate a structural microeconomeric model of entries into and exits out of self-employment, which includes the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) as a parameter. This allows decomposing the gender differentials in the transition rates into three components: differences in observed endowments; differences in the econometrically estimated level of risk aversion;
and differences in the other estimated coefficients, which may be related to creditor or consumer discrimination. This decomposition relies on a novel extension of the BlinderOaxaca technique for nonlinear models.
The structural transition models estimated in this paper are related to work by Kanbur (1982) and Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979) , who modeled entrepreneurial choice as trading off risk and returns. They suggested that the less risk averse become entrepreneurs and may receive a risk premium as compensation for the greater variance of their earnings. The historical roots of these models are in the work of Knight (1921) , according to whom the central role of the entrepreneur is to bear uncertainty. Recent empirical studies found evidence that risk attitudes play a significant role in the decisions to become and remain self-employed (Cramer et al., 2002; Kritikos, 2008 and 2009 ).
Thus, the microeconometric transition models take account of both the expected value and the variance of earnings in self-employment and dependent employment. In the estimation of the first and second moments of gross earnings, I control for non-random selection into the alternative employment states. Kunze (2005) pointed out the importance of selection in the analysis of gender differentials. As taxation has been shown to influence entrepreneurial choice (e.g. Schuetze, 2000; Bruce, 2002; Cullen and Gordon, 2007; Fossen and Steiner, 2009 ), net income is calculated from estimated gross income using an estimated tax function. Not only one period's income, but lifetime income matters for the significant decision to enter or exit self-employment. This is taken into account by predicting the profiles of the future expected value and variance of net earnings over each individual's lifetime conditional on the choice to be self-employed or dependently employed. Annuities of these streams enter the structural transition model.
Attempts to estimate a structural model of entrepreneurial choice incorporating earnings and risk have been very rare. Rees and Shah (1986) formulated a model of the probability of being self-employed assuming a CRRA utility function, but used a simplified model without an explicit risk parameter in the estimation. Pfeiffer and Pohlmeier (1992) specified a similar model and actually estimated its parameters using the first waves of the German SocioEconomic Panel. The model did not allow for individual differences in the level of earnings risk, however. Rosen and Willen (2002) used the Panel Study of Income Dynamics and found that in comparison to wage employment, self-employment both comes with an increase in mean yearly consumption and an increased variance of returns, which is consistent with a risk premium for the self-employed.
5
5 Rosen and Willen (2002) used the measured level and variance of income in the two employment states to asses a theoretical model of self-employment choice, but came to the conclusion that the risk premium was too
The results obtained in this paper from estimating the transitions models indicate risk aversion and confirm the theoretical presumptions: Higher expected net earnings in selfemployment relative to dependent employment are found to attract people to become and to remain entrepreneurs, whereas higher variance discourages them from choosing this option.
Women are found to be more risk averse than men, which is consistent with the literature. The decomposition of the gender differentials in the transition rates yields that women's higher estimated risk aversion explains the largest part of their higher exit rate out of selfemployment, but only a small part of their lower entry rate.
Section 2 of this paper develops the structural transition model. It is translated into an empirical discrete time hazard rate model in section 3.1. Section 3.2 briefly introduces the data. The methodology for the estimation of lifetime annuities of the expected value and the variance of net earnings, controlling for selection, is described in section 3.3. Section 4 presents the estimation results of the model, along with a sensitivity analysis, and the decomposition of the gender differential in the estimated transition rates. Section 5 concludes.
The Structural Transition Model
To analyze entrepreneurial choice, I model the decision to switch between the two states dependent employment and self-employment in a discrete time hazard rate framework. 6 This allows consistently taking into account duration dependence. 7 Transitions from dependent employment to self-employment (entry model) and transitions from self-employment to large to be rationalized by conventional measures of risk aversion. A possible explanation may be that the authors used yearly income and did not take into account that the self-employed work more weekly hours on average than wage employees. A related stream of literature has analyzed the earnings differential between selfemployment and dependent employment, without considering the difference in the variance of earnings. These studies include Fraser and Greene (2006) and Taylor (1996) , who confirmed that higher expected earnings in self-employment relatively to paid employment significantly increase the probability of becoming selfemployed; Hammarstedt (2006) , who established the same result for Swedish immigrants; Dolton and Makepeace (1990) and Rees and Shah (1986) , who also found a positive, but insignificant effect; and Hamilton (2000) , who in contrast concluded that factors other than earnings induce people to become self-employed. 6 A similar model is used in Fossen (2009) to study the effect of income taxation on entrepreneurship. 7 Entrepreneurial exit has been analyzed similarly based on hazard rate models by Evans and Leighton (1989) , Audretsch and Mahmood (1995) , Taylor (1999) , Tervo and Haapanen (2009), and Falck (2007) , the latter using German establishment data.
dependent employment (exit model) are specified analogously; in the following, the entry model is described.
In a given period t, a dependently employed individual rationally chooses if he or she wants to remain dependently employed or switch to self-employment in the following period t+1. The agent will enter self-employment if his/her expected utility in self-employment (se) is higher than in dependent employment (e):
where i is an index over observations in the pooled sample of the dependently employed, y i,se is a person's current lifetime annuity of future net earnings from self-employment, starting from t+1, and y i,e is the lifetime annuity of future net wages from dependent employment.
Both y i,se and y i,e are random variables because future income is risky. In this model, it is assumed that people know the probability distribution of their future income in both occupational states. The expected utility with respect to y is approximated by a second order
Taylor series expansion around µ y :
where µ y = E(y) and σ y 2 = Var(y) and the subscripts of y are suppressed for simplicity. The
The following assumes constant relative risk aversion (CRRA). 9 This implies that the utility function must satisfy
where the constant ρ is the coefficient of CRRA (Pratt, 1964) . The following random utility function satisfies the CRRA condition, yields increasing utility for money y>0, and allows utility in the two alternative employment states j∈{se;e} to vary across observations depending on observable characteristics and covariates x i , the duration in dependent employment d i , and an error term ε ij :
The parameter α >0 reflects the weight of the risk adjusted income annuity in the utility function. This specification implies risk preference for ρ < 0, risk neutrality for ρ = 0 and risk aversion for ρ > 0. The error term ε ij captures unobservable tastes influencing utility. These tastes are unobservable for the researcher and thus treated as a random variable, but they are known to the individuals in the sample, in contrast to the error in future earnings y.
Unobserved factors influencing utility in self-employment might include the desire to be independent (Taylor, 1996) or the believe in the power of one's own actions (Evans and Leighton, 1989) . The function ϕ j describes a possibly nonlinear influence of the spell duration in dependent employment on utility in each of the two states, for instance through habituation.
The vector x i controls for variables that emerged as important determinants of selfemployment in prior studies: age, education, work experience, unemployment experience, number of children, region, and a constant (for example, see Taylor, 1996; Evans and Leighton, 1989;  for German data see Georgellis and Wall, 2005; Holtz-Eakin and Rosen, 2005) . Furthermore, Parker (2008) and Brown et al. (2006) found evidence that an individual's household context has an influence on the decision to be self-employed. This is accounted for by including the marital status, the spouse's employment state, if applicable, and the income of other household members in x i . Section 4.3 includes a sensitivity analysis with respect to the control variables.
The first and second order partial derivations of U with respect to y (suppressing subscripts j and i) are 1 ( , , , ) , ( , , , ) . 
Plugging U'' into equation (2) yields expected utility with respect to y:
For α >0 and µ y > 0, the equation implies that for risk-averse agents expected utility decreases with greater variance of earnings. Implicitly it is assumed that the market does not provide insurance against income risk, which is plausible given moral hazard and adverse selection.
For risk-neutral agents the variance does not matter, and for risk-loving individuals, greater variance actually increases expected utility. Taking the expectation with respect to the random earnings variable y did not remove the utility error term ε.
As the agent chooses the employment state which gives him/her the highest utility, the probability that he/she decides to switch to entrepreneurship is
where trans i is a binary indicator variable that equals 1 if a transition to self-employment is observed between t and t+1, and 0 otherwise; β = β se -β e ; F is the cumulative density function of the error term ε i = ε i,e -ε i,se ; and
can be interpreted as expected risk adjusted income. The probability of remaining in dependent employment is the complementary probability
3 Empirical Methodology
Specification of the Empirical Models
In order to estimate the parameters of the structural transition models using the maximum likelihood method, it remains to specify the functions ϕ j of the duration in employment state j and the cumulative density function F of the error terms ε i = ε i,e -ε i,se in equation (7). The functional form of ϕ j is specified as a cubic polynomial (higher order polynomials were not significant, see section 4.3):
It follows that
where δ k = δ k,se -δ k,e for k ∈{1;2;3}.
The log likelihood function for the sample of the dependently employed in the entry model can now be written as (
Following McFadden's (1974) random utility model, the error terms ε i,e and ε i,se are assumed to be independently and identically distributed, with the type I extreme value distribution. As
McFadden showed, it follows that F is the cumulative logistic probability distribution.
Alternatively assuming that F is the cumulative normal distribution yields similar results (see section 4.3).
As mentioned, the exit model based on the sample of the self-employed is specified exactly analogously to the entry model. 10 The entry and exit models are estimated jointly with the same structural risk aversion parameter ρ in both models. The other coefficients are allowed to differ between the two models. Before the transition models can be estimated by maximizing the likelihood function, the annuities of the expected value of net income, µ y , and its variance, σ y
Data
This analysis is based on the German Socio-Economic Panel ( This paper focuses on the choice between full-time dependent employment and full-time self-employment, because the attention is on the comparison of earnings in the two alternative employment states, not on the decision to work full-time or part-time or the decision to work or not to work. Thus, as in Taylor (1996) and Rees and Shah (1986) , the structural transition models are based on full-time working individuals. Part-time work and non-participation are much more relevant for women than for men in Germany, which is addressed in two ways.
First, a two-step procedure controls for non-random selection into the full-time working categories (see section 3.3). Second, in a robustness check, transitions into part-time dependent employment or self-employment are taken into account as well. The results remain largely unchanged (see section 4.3).
In the sample of full-time working individuals, the unweighted (weighted) male selfemployment rate is 6.9 % (6.8 %), whereas the female rate is only 4.3 % (4.1 %). The yearly transition rate from dependent employment into self-employment as a percentage of the dependently employed is 0.94 % (0.95 %) for men and 0.6 % (0.65 %) for women. The yearly transition rate from self-employment to dependent employment as a percentage of the selfemployed is 7.5 % (6.9 %) for men and 7.9 % (8.9 %) for women. Thus, the lower selfemployment rate among women is explained both by a lower entry rate and a higher exit rate, where the gender difference in the entry rate is much larger in relative terms. 
Estimation of Annuities of the Expected Value and the Variance of Net Earnings
This section outlines the estimation strategy for the annuities of the expected value of net earnings µ y and the variance of net earnings σ y 2 in the two alternative states self-employment and dependent employment. The estimations are conducted separately for men and women because of the well documented differences in male and female wage equations.
A two-step procedure is applied to control for selection effects in the earnings and variance regressions. People self-select into 5 possible employment states: full-time and parttime self-employment, full-time and part-time dependent employment and unemployment/inactivity. The probability of being observed in each of these 5 employment states j is estimated based on a multinomial logit model: Maddala, 1983, pp. 275-278) .
For each observation in the sample the expected net income must be estimated for the two alternative states self-employment and wage employment. Hourly gross earnings from dependent employment (using the sample of the full-time dependently employed) and from 12 γ j is normalized to 0 for the base category j="unemployment/inactivity"
13 Having a self-employed father is used as an exclusion restriction as this characteristic is likely to have an impact on the probability of being self-employed (e.g. Dunn and Holtz-Eakin, 2000) , but is not expected to have an influence on earnings after controlling for other relevant factors (cp. Taylor, 1996) . In Germany, selfemployed mothers were rare in the generation of most respondents' parents, so only self-employed fathers are used. 14 The number of children and marital status are well known to influence the decision to participate in the labor market and the choice between part-time and full-time work, especially for women, but are not expected to influence gross earnings (cp. Rees and Shah, 1986 Taylor (1996) , and Rees and Shah (1986) , by including industry dummies, which are well proven determinants of earnings, in z i earn only.
16
Additionally to the expected earnings, the variance of earnings is also required to estimate the transition models. The variance is estimated based on a flexible specification of a heteroscedasticity function. The natural logarithms of the squared residuals from the earnings estimation are regressed on the explanatory variables of the earnings model z i earn and the selection term λ ij to control for selection, separately for the two employment states j∈{se;e}:
15 Income information for year t is obtained from retrospective questions in wave t+1 about a respondent's average monthly gross income in t, differentiated by income from dependent employment and self-employment. Income from self-employment (employment) is only averaged over months in which the respondent was actually self-employed (employed), so the information remains accurate if the respondent switched between employment states. Earnings levels rather than log(earnings) are used in the regression to avoid excluding people who report zero earnings, which is sometimes observed for the self-employed during temporary periods (cp. Hamilton, 2000) . 16 Additionally dummy variables for German nationality and physical handicap are added to the earnings equations, as these variables turn out to be important for the prediction of earnings. Year dummies are also included to account for the business cycle.
where e ij is the error term. 17 In contrast to the estimation of a population parameter, this approach allows the predicted second moment of earnings to vary not only between the states self-employment and dependent employment and by gender, but also with individual characteristics and covariates, just like the predicted first moment.
To derive net (after-tax) income from predicted gross income, the German progressive income tax schedule must be approximated. As the SOEP provides information about both a respondent's gross and net income, individual and period specific average tax rates τ i , can be calculated:
where grossinc i and netinc i are gross and net income. 18 These tax rates τ i , are regressed on a vector z i tax of variables relevant for the tax code:
where κ is the coefficient vector and v i is the error term capturing specifics of the tax legislation which cannot be taken into account in this approximation. 19 The vector z i tax includes polynomials of the first, second and third degree of gross yearly income to model the non-linear nature of the tax function, a "married" dummy, additionally interacted with a "female" dummy (to account for the effect of income splitting), the number of children, a "disabled" dummy, and a "self-employed" dummy (to allow for differential tax treatment).
After this tax function is estimated, it can be used to predict average tax rates conditional on the predicted gross incomes in both the true and the counter-factual employment states and on 17 To obtain consistent predictions for the squared residuals, the predicted values from the log model must be exponentiated and multiplied with the expected value of exp(e ij ). A consistent estimator for the expected value of exp(e ij ) is obtained from a regression of the squared residuals on the exponentiated predicted values from the log model through the origin. This procedure does not require normality of e ij . 18 Additionally to the retrospective income questions in the SOEP, respondents are asked to state their gross and net income in the month before the interview. It is assumed that this reflects average monthly income. Taxes are levied on yearly income, of course, but a multiplication of gross and net incomes by 12 (or some other factor) is irrelevant as it would cancel out in the tax rate formula (16). 19 All working respondents, no matter if full-time or part-time, provide information that is used to estimate this tax function.
individual characteristics. 20 This allows deriving the expected value and variance of net income in both alternatives.
Not only one period's net income, but lifetime net income matters for the significant decision to enter or exit self-employment. This is taken into account by predicting the profiles of the future expected value and variance of net earnings over each individual's lifetime conditional on the choice to be self-employed or dependently employed. Then individual lifetime annuities of net income are computed using the net present value method:
where q is the real interest rate plus one, 21 and n i is the number of remaining years of economic activity for observation i; the individual horizon is assumed to be reached at the age 
Empirical Results

Net Earnings and Variance Estimation
After having estimated the gross earnings and variance equations (14) and (15), controlling for selection, 22 the expected value and the variance of gross earnings can be predicted for each 20 Predicted y ij g are hourly incomes, whereas the tax function requires yearly income. For the conversion, the average number of hours worked in the sample of full-time working people is used. 21 The real interest rate is assumed to be 5%. The results are not sensitive to the choice of q within a reasonable range, see section 4.3. 22 Table A 1 in Appendix A shows that the variables used as exclusion restrictions (fatherse, married, and nchild) are significant in the selection equation (13). The coefficient of the selectivity term λ is negative in all earnings regressions (see Table A 2), which indicates that the error terms in the selection equation and the earnings equation (14) are negatively correlated. It is significant in the models of dependent employment only.
individual in the two alternative states self-employment and dependent employment. 23 Using the estimated tax rate function (17), net earnings and their variance can be calculated. 24 The results from these estimations are summarized in Tables A 1 through Figure 2 shows that on average, self-employed men would initially earn higher hourly gross income in dependent employment than in self-employment, but self-employment is rewarded higher for them after about 15 years. Net income is higher for them in selfemployment almost from the beginning on. This finding supports the hypothesis that higher net earnings in self-employment induce the self-employed to choose this state. The picture is similar for self-employed women, although women have to endure a considerable period of slightly lower net earnings in self-employment before these exceed the counter-factual wages from dependent employment.
Insignificant and sometimes negative selection terms in regressions of earnings from self-employment are often reported in the literature (e.g. Rees and Shah, 1986; Evans and Leighton, 1989; Dolton and Makepeace, 1990; and Borjas and Bronars, 1989) , suggesting that there is no significant selection on unobservables; Taylor (1996) , in contrast, reports positive and significant selection effects. 23 In the earnings variance regression (see Table A 3), the explanatory variables are jointly significant for both employment states and genders, which confirms the hypothesis that earnings are heteroscedastic (Breusch-Pagan test). This result shows that the variance of earnings not only differs between dependent employment and selfemployment and by gender, but also between individuals, depending on their characteristics and covariates. 24 The results from the tax rate regression (see Table A 4) show that the individual average tax rate increases with gross income at diminishing rates, which reflects the progressive income tax code in Germany.
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Dependently employed people would on average earn more if they were self-employed, both in gross and in net terms, as Figure earnings. This can be explained by the progressive income tax system in Germany. It can also be observed that the variation coefficient is larger in self-employment than in dependent employment for all groups, i.e. for actually self-employed and dependently employed men and women, and both before and after tax. The difference between the earnings variation in self-employment and dependent employment is more pronounced for those actually dependently employed than for those actually self-employed. Thus, switching to selfemployment would require the dependently employed to tolerate a much higher earnings risk, and risk aversion could explain why employees do not switch to self-employment in spite of the higher expected value of earnings.
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Estimation Results of the Transition Models
After the individual predicted net earnings and net variance profiles over time (till the age of 64) are summarized as annuities (see section 3.3), the structural models of transition rates between the alternative employment states dependent employment and self-employment (7) can be estimated. Table 1 shows the coefficients resulting from the likelihood maximization with their heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in brackets below. For each gender, the model of entry into self-employment from dependent employment is shown in the left and the model of exit from self-employment towards dependent employment in the right column. A positive sign of a coefficient indicates that the corresponding variable increases the probability of a transition to the alternative employment state.
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The estimated coefficient of CRRA ρ is positive and significant both for men and women, which indicates risk aversion. The estimated degree of risk aversion is low for men and higher, but still moderate, for women. The estimates are consistent with Holt and Laury (2002) , who reported a range for the CRRA coefficient around 0.3-0.5. The difference between the estimated degrees of risk aversion for men and women is statistically significant.
A Wald test rejects equality of the ρ parameters at the 10 % confidence level (p-value = 0.0681), based on the robust standard errors reported, and at the 5 % level (p-value = 0.0275) based on non-robust standard errors. The finding that women are more risk averse than men is consistent with the literature, as mentioned in the introduction.
The coefficient of the risk adjusted differential between net income from selfemployment and from dependent employment α is significant in all models and positive in the models of entry into self-employment and negative in the models of exit. The four models thus consistently confirm the hypothesis that a higher risk adjusted net income in selfemployment in comparison to dependent employment induces people both to become and to remain self-employed.
Sensitivity Analysis
This section assesses the sensitivity of the estimation results with respect to potentially critical assumptions made. Table A 5 probit instead of logit specification is used, the estimated degree of risk aversion is somewhat higher for men and considerably higher for women (row 4). Higher risk aversion for women also results under the assumption of a real interest rate of 8 % (row 7). The difference in risk aversion between men and women may thus rather be underestimated than overestimated in the main specification, and risk aversion may play a larger role in explaining the gender differential in the self-employment rates. The standard error of women's ρ also increases in these two specifications, however. The lower estimated value in the main specification remains within the 95 % confidence interval of the estimate reported in row (7), but not of that reported in row (4).
When instead of annuities over the individually remaining years of economic activity
only the expected value and variance of net income in the next year are used in the transition models (row 8), ρ becomes insignificant for both genders, with a very large standard error for men. As argued in section 3.3, it seems unlikely that agents only look at next year's income prospects when deciding to make a transition between dependent employment and selfemployment, and it would be irrational; thus, this specification may not be very informative.
Decomposition of the Gender Gap in the Transition Rates
The aim of this section is to decompose the differentials between the female and male transition rates into components explained by different endowments, as represented by the variables, by the higher risk aversion estimated for women, and by differences in the other estimated coefficients. The familiar Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition technique (Blinder, 1973; Oaxaca, 1973 ) is adapted in three ways. First, the variation used here takes account of the nonlinearity of the estimated transition models, similarly to Fairlie (1999 Fairlie ( , 2007 , and Bauer and Sinning (2008) . The observed transition rates Y , i.e. the proportion of those making a transitions in the subsamples, are very close to the average predicted transition probabilities Ŷ : The relative deviation of Ŷ from Y is 0.013 % for the male and 0.755 % for the female entry rate, and 0.001 % for the male and female exit rates. A nonlinear decomposition of the gender differentials in the average transition rates into two components can thus be written as A well-known issue is whether the coefficients for men or women should be used in the second summand to assess the contribution of the variables (index problem). The second adaptation of the decomposition technique is that I follow Oaxaca and Ransom (1994) 
The 3 rd summand is the contribution of the variables, the sum of the 2 nd and 4 th summands is the contribution of the risk attitude, and the sum of the 1 st and last summands is the contribution of the remaining coefficients. Table 2 presents the decomposition of the entry rate (left three columns) and the exit rate (right three columns) without weighting. Columns 1 and 4 show the average predicted transition rates in the entry and the exit models. Columns 2 and 5 give the differences which correspond to the five summands in equation (20), and columns 3 and 4 present these differences relative to the total gap in the male and female transition rates. The relative difference reported in row 4 is the contribution of the variables to the gender gap, the sum of rows 3 and 5 is the contribution of the estimated risk aversion parameter, and the sum of rows 25 The full estimation results are available from the author upon request.
2 and 6 is the contribution of the other coefficients. Especially in the exit model, some of the decomposition steps change the transition rate into the direction opposite to the overall gender difference, which means the contributions of these steps to the gender gap are negative.
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE Table 3 summarizes the decomposition of the gender differentials in the entry and exit rates into the three components mentioned. Additionally to the unweighted decomposition, the two columns to the right present the results obtained by weighting the predicted transition rates using population weights (see section 3.2). In both the unweighted and the weighted analysis, only about 2 % of women's lower entry rate are explained by their higher estimated degree of risk aversion. About 10 % (17 %) are explained by the variables without (with) weighting. The remaining 88 % (82 %) are due to differences in the other coefficients: the same endowments make self-employment less attractive for women than they do for men.
This may partly reflect creditor or consumer discrimination.
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The variables, which together explain between about 10 % and 17 % of the gender gap (without / with weighting), include the estimated annuities of the expected value and the variance of earnings in both employment states. These earnings variables may themselves partly be influenced by discrimination against women. In fact, standard Blinder-Oaxaca decompositions of the gender differentials in estimated earnings (using coefficients from a pooled regression as in Oaxaca and Ransom, 1994; unweighted) yield that only 39.9 % of the gap in earnings from dependent employment and 34.2 % of the gap in earnings from selfemployment are explained by observed variables. An analogous decomposition shows that just 26.1 % (22.2 %) of the gender differential in the variance of earnings from dependent employment (self-employment) are explained by the variables. Taking this into account, even less of the gender gap in the entry rate can be attributed to gender differences in endowments.
The 17 % obtained from the weighted decomposition thus represent an upper bound.
In contrast to the differential in the entry rate, the higher female average exit rate out of self-employment is explained by women's higher estimated degree of risk aversion, either completely (in the unweighted decomposition) or at least to the largest part (in the weighted case). Given the gender difference in risk aversion alone, the differential in the exit rate would even be larger than the differential actually observed. This is compensated for by the other coefficients, which have the opposite effect and decrease the women's exit rate. While these general results are obtained both from the unweighted and the weighed decompositions, the effect of the risk attitude is much stronger in the unweighted analysis. Here, given the gender difference in risk aversion alone, the differential in the exit rate would be more than three times as large as the differential actually observed.
For the interpretation of this large relative effect it is important to consider that the gender differential in the exit rate is relatively small, however: The unweighted female exit rate is only 4.3 % higher than the male exit rate, whereas the unweighted female entry rate is 36.3 % lower (this is calculated from the figures in the first and last rows of columns 1 and 4 in Table 2 ). As the gender differential in the entry rate is much larger in relative terms than the differential in the exit rate, the results from the decomposition of the entry rate are more relevant for the explanation of the gender gap in the self-employment rate. The relatively small gender differential in the exit rate may also explain why the estimates from the decomposition of the exit rate are less robust to weighting than the estimates from the decomposition of the entry rate.
Conclusion
The self-employment rate among women is much lower than among men in almost all OECD countries. In Germany, women's lower self-employment rate is due both to a lower entry rate and -to a smaller extent -to a higher exit rate. This paper investigated the role played by gender differences in the degree of risk aversion. The gender differentials in the transition rates between dependent employment and self-employment, and vice versa, were decomposed into components explained by 1. differences in observable endowments, 2. differences in the econometrically estimated coefficient of constant relative risk aversion (CRRA), and 3.
differences in other estimated coefficients.
To achieve this, a structural microeconometric model of the transition probabilities including the parameter of CRRA was estimated. The estimation results from this model show that not only the expected value, but also the variance of an individual's future after-tax income play a significant role in the choice between self-employment and dependent employment. Higher expected net earnings in self-employment relative to dependent employment attract people to become and to remain self-employed, whereas higher variance discourages them from choosing this option. The estimated coefficient of CRRA indicates that men and women are moderately risk averse, and women are significantly more risk averse than men. The estimated structural transition model was then used as the basis for a non-linear Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition.
The result from the decomposition of the gender differential in the entry rate into selfemployment is that only about 2 % of the gap are due to women's higher level of risk aversion. Considering potential discrimination effects on expected earnings, less than 17 % of the differential are explained by gender differences in endowments. The largest part of the lower female entry rate thus remains unexplained and may potentially, at least in part, be attributed to creditor or consumer discrimination against self-employed women.
In contrast to the differential in the entry rate, the largest part of the higher exit rate of women out of self-employment is explained by their higher level of risk aversion. The remaining coefficients even reduce the gender gap. The gender differential in the exit rate is much smaller in relative terms than the differential in the entry rate, however, and thus contributes less to the gender differential in the self-employment rate.
Understanding the causes of the low female self-employment rate is important for the design of appropriate policies. Policymakers may aim to increase female entrepreneurship for efficiency reasons, if discrimination against women leads to a sub-optimal allocation. If not discrimination, but gender differences in risk preferences lead to the unequal self-employment rate, government intervention may not be required for efficiency reasons, but may still be desired to reach equality targets.
As women's higher risk aversion and gender differences in endowments only explain a small part of the lower female entry rate into self-employment, the results from this analysis suggest that creditor and consumer discrimination may hinder female entry. State-subsidized credit schemes for female-led businesses in the start-up phase may thus facilitate the step into self-employment for women. As gender differences in risk aversion are found to be the primary reason for the higher female exit rate, further subsidized credit schemes targeted at already established female-led enterprises do not seem to be required. If policymakers want to reduce the female exit rate, risk-sharing offered by the government, e.g. through taxation, may be a suitable instrument to encourage female entrepreneurs to stay self-employed. Comparing the instruments, subsidized credit schemes for female-led start-up firms are more likely to increase women's self-employment rate, as the gender differential in the entry rate is much larger in relative terms, and are also more likely to increase efficiency. Further research is necessary to investigate how much of the large unexplained part of the gender differential in the entry rate found here is due to creditor and consumer discrimination. effects on the probabilities of the outcome categories "full-time self-employment" and "full-time dependent employment". For dummy variables, the change in the probability caused by a discrete change from 0 to 1 are reported. The categories "part-time self-employment" and "part-time dependent employment" are not shown for brevity and available upon request. The base category is "unemployment / inactivity". Stars (* / ** / ***) indicate significance at the 5% / 1% / 0.1% level. Source: Own calculations based on the SOEP 1984-2004. 
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